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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effect of Anonymity on the WTA – WTP Gap in  
Endowment Effect Games. (May 2012) 
 
Gregory Cohen 
Department of Economics 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Alex Brown 
Department of Economics 
 
I conducted experiments to determine whether anonymity affects the gap between the 
willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) in endowment effect games. 
Earlier research theorizes complete anonymity is necessary to eliminate the 
contamination of “signaling” within the endowment effect game. The “signaling” results 
when buyers over-value their items and sellers under-value the items they are trading for 
to signal they are good bargainers, which leads to suboptimal decisions. I find that the 
difference between an anonymous treatment and a non-anonymous treatment yield WTA 
– WTP gaps that are not statistically significant. I utilize a dictator game to ensure my 
anonymity procedure is sufficient. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Endowment effect theory 
Endowment effect theory was introduced in 1980 by Richard Thaler. He theorized an 
“endowment effect” occurs when an item becomes part of an individual’s belongings. 
When an individual considers an item as his own property, he or she views giving up 
that item as a loss. According to loss aversion theory, losses are weighed more heavily 
than gains, and this causes the individual who owns an item to give it more value than 
someone who does not own it. In short, the “endowment effect” refers to the extra value 
an owner gives an item in his possession (Thaler 1980). 
 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 
The first major endowment effect experiment was conducted by Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), henceforth known as KKT, performed an 
experiment involving the trading of mugs. In the experiment, half the subjects were 
given mugs and were labeled “sellers.” The remaining subjects, known as “buyers,” 
were allowed to examine the mugs, though they were not owners, and had the 
opportunity to buy a mug. Each group was asked to provide their best price for an item: 
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of the American Economic Review. 
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for buyers, it was the price they would be willing to pay, or WTP, and for sellers, it was 
the price they would be willing to accept, or WTA. According to economic theory, the 
average WTA and average WTP should be the same, revealing the market value of the 
mug, but KKT found an asymmetry in the data. According to their data, the WTA was 
about 1.5 to 2 times the WTP (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). Owners of a mug 
were attaching more value to the mug than those who did not own a mug. KKT 
attributed the difference to an “endowment effect.”  
 
This KKT “mug experiment” has been a hotbed of behavioral economics controversy 
since its publication. Criticism includes whether the language used caused the effect 
(Franciosi et al. 1996), whether loss aversion adversely affects both parties (Bateman et 
al. 2005), whether the degree of substitutability between products being traded differs 
(Shogren et al. 1994), whether there is a different loss aversion factor involved (Brown 
2005) and whether imprecise preferences cause the disparity (Dubourg, Jones-Lee, and 
Loomes 1994). 
 
Plott and Zeiler 
The most notable study contesting the KKT results was published by Plott and Zeiler 
(2005), henceforth known as PZ. PZ theorized that by removing subject contamination 
and misconceptions about the mechanism used in the experiment, the WTA – WTP gap 
would disappear. After repeating the KKT experiment using their own procedure to 
eliminate as much contamination and misconceptions as possible, PZ found no statistical 
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difference between the WTA and WTP (Plott and Zeiler 2005). Since this finding, 
scholars have debated whether PZ actually proved KKT wrong, or if other factors 
accounted for the elimination of the WTA – WTP gap shown by KKT, such as an 
endowment effect not present in KKT (Isoni, Loomes, and Sugden 2011) or repeated 
markets affected the endowment effect (Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden 2003). 
 
Anonymity in Plott and Zeiler 
One way in which PZ prevents contamination of the WTA – WTP gap data is by making 
their experiment anonymous. PZ, citing Fremling and Posner (1999), theorized that even 
if only the experimenter knows who the subject is, their payout amount, and no other 
person in the room, a subject may still adjust his or her behavior in order to be seen as a 
“better bargainer” by the experimenter. In most cases this behavior is not in the best 
interest of a subject and leads to a smaller payout (Fremling and Posner 1999). PZ 
theorized this lack of anonymity could have contributed to the WTA – WTP gap and 
therefore made their experiment anonymous. The justification which PZ uses, though, is 
based on social preference. The effect of anonymity on social preference games is well 
documented in dictator games (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996; Eckel and 
Grossman 1996; Burnham 2003; Charness and Gneezy 2008). PZ and consequent 
experimenters assume anonymity is just as important to endowment effect games as it is 
to dictator game, a hypothesis which may not necessarily be correct. 
 
 
  4 
Anonymity’s effect on endowment and dictator games 
The effect anonymity has on dictator games and other social preference games are most 
likely caused by a lack of guilt. Charness and Gneezy (2008) illustrated this by 
comparing anonymous dictators to dictators who knew they were giving to a charity. 
The dictators giving to a charity, on average, donated more than their anonymous 
counterpart due to a guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006). When someone is 
playing anonymously, they are disconnected from the beneficiary and do not suffer from 
guilt aversion and therefore their donations decrease. Endowment effect games, unlike 
dictator games, do not have a zero-sum component. In PZ, as long as a player indicates 
they are willing to pay or willing to accept at a certain threshold, the trade was made: 
their decisions did not rely on others. This eliminates the idea that subjects would suffer 
from guilt aversion while making their offers. Therefore, assuming that anonymity 
affects endowment effect based off social preference games is incorrect. 
 
Fremling and Posner (1999) state anonymity is important to endowment effect games 
because a lack of complete anonymity, even from the experimenter, will lead subjects to 
try and “signal” they are greater negotiators by either selling for a higher price or buying 
at a lower price. Although the difference between complete anonymity and complete 
disclosure would be affected by this notion, the difference between complete anonymity 
and moderate anonymity (i.e. screen protectors and silence) is much less important. In a 
moderately anonymous setting, although there may be a motive to “signal,” there are 
motives in the opposite direction which may counteract the “signal.” For example, envy 
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may play a role in endowment effect games (Kirchsteiger 1994). Subjects who are not 
able to complete any transactions may feel envious of those who do complete 
transactions and may adjust their prices as time goes on to avoid envy. If rewards are 
paid after each round, the envy will build in those who are signaling, and the signaling 
effect will be either counterbalanced or exceeded. 
 
To test whether anonymity does have an effect on the WTP – WTA gap, I will perform 
two PZ style experiments. In the first experiment, subjects will remain anonymous to 
each other only. In the second experiment subjects will be anonymous to all parties 
involved. Complete anonymity will be fulfilled by not allowing any party, including the 
experimenters, to know either the name or appearances of the subjects and the amount of 
compensation they will receive. This will be done by using two treatments. In the first 
treatment, the experimenter will know the identity of the subjects and their performance. 
In the second treatment, the experimenter will only know the identity and the 
identification number of a subject, while an assistant will know the identification number 
and the compensation the subject receives. The results of the two PZ style experiments 
will be compared and the WTP – WTA gaps will be analyzed to determine whether they 
are significantly different. I hypothesize that there will be no difference in the WTP – 
WTA gap exhibited in the endowment effect game. Since it is well documented that 
there is an anonymity effect in the dictator game, a Hoffman, et al. (1996) experiment 
will also be conducted to illustrate my experiment is sufficiently anonymous. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
 
My experimental method was a modified form of the PZ experimental method (Plot and 
Zeiler 2005). All forms and instructions can be found in the appendix and are available 
upon request.  
 
Treatment 1: Non-anonymous treatment 
The first treatment consisted of 52 subjects across two groups. The subjects were 
randomly drawn from the Texas A&M University Economics Department’s database 
(ORSEE) of subjects willing to participate in departmental treatments. The subjects were 
randomly assigned identification numbers ranging from 1 – 30. Unused numbers were 
noted and left out of the treatment. Subjects were then separated into buyers and sellers 
by pairing identification numbers (IDN) with a random number. The random numbers, 
produced by a random number generator in Excel, were then ranked in ascending order 
and the top half of the generated numbers were labeled as buyers and the bottom half 
were labeled as sellers. Subjects were then asked to sit in an assigned area. Seats were 
separated by large dividers and subjects could not see the actions of other players. 
Subjects were reminded by the instructor that they were not allowed to communicate 
throughout the treatment. Instruction sheets (available in the appendix) were then handed 
out to the subjects and mugs were handed out to the sellers. Subjects were then allowed 
to ask clarification questions regarding the instruction sheets. 
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Subjects were then asked to begin Treatment 1. Subjects first participated in two practice 
rounds to familiarize themselves with the elicitation method. In the two practice rounds, 
henceforth known as Practice Rounds 1 and 2, subjects were given a theoretical token of 
a given value. Subjects were then asked to indicate at which prices they were willing to 
buy or sell the token and which prices they were not willing to buy or sell the token on a 
form, illustrated in Figure 1. Subjects could only be identified by the identification 
number to keep their personal information confidential. Subjects could 
 
 
FIGURE 1. EXAMPLE OF THE ELICITATION METHOD 
 
still be connected to their buying and selling behavior through their receipts, and 
therefore this treatment was not sufficiently anonymous. Subjects were given a period to 
complete their form and were then asked to fold their form in half as the experimenter 
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picked up the forms. The forms were given to the assistant who collated the data to form 
receipts. The assistant was able to see the subjects and observe the behavior within the 
room. After the forms were given to the assistant, a clearing price was then chosen by 
rolling a 10 sided die. A randomly chosen subject was asked to roll the die and then the 
number was announced to the class. For example, if a seven was rolled, the clearing 
price would be the seventh number, or $0.70 in Figure 1. Those who were willing to buy 
or sell at or above the clearing price made the trade while those who were not willing 
were unaffected. There was no penalty to those who did not make a trade. All subjects 
with a token were given the value of the token at the end of the treatment. Subjects did 
not depend on one another to execute a trade to keep from contaminating the data with 
other regarding behavior.  
 
The experimenter then described the optimal behavior for Practice Round 1. Sellers were 
told it was in their best interest to sell at any price above the value of the token while 
buyers were told it was in their best interest to buy at any price below the value of the 
token. This was done to ensure subjects understood the purpose of the treatment and to 
make them familiar with the elicitation method. Subjects then started Practice Round 2 
in which the first practice round was repeated but with different token values and a price 
range from $0.20 to $2.00. Subjects were once again told what the optimal behavior 
would have been for Practice Round 2. 
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For the third round, henceforth known as the Mug Round, sellers were asked to look at 
the mugs on their desk and were told that they now owned the mug. The mugs were 
simple maroon mugs with a Texas A&M University logo, a popular mug type at the 
university, and could be purchased for $3.00 at a local store. Sellers were told they had 
the opportunity to sell the mugs in the next round to a buyer. Sellers were then asked to 
allow buyers to examine the mug for a short period, then the mug was promptly returned 
to the seller. In the next round, both buyers and sellers were asked to indicate, using 
forms similar to Figure 1, at which prices they were willing to buy or sell the mugs. The 
prices ranged from $0.50 to $5.00. After indicating at which prices they would buy and 
sell the mugs, the forms were collected and a random subject was asked to roll the die at 
the front of the room. The number rolled on the die corresponded to the different prices 
on the sheet with 1 corresponding to $0.50 through 0 corresponding with $5.00, or the 
tenth number. The mugs remained with the sellers until the end of the treatment. 
 
After the Mug Round was finished, subjects participated in a standard dictator game. 
Since it is known how anonymity affects dictator games, I am using the dictator game to 
make sure my sample is drawn from a similar population and my elicitation method 
produces results to similar studies, such as Hoffman, et al. (1996). Subjects were 
separated again using a second randomly generated sequence of numbers. Each IDN was 
matched with a random number and the random numbers were placed in ascending 
order. The top half of the random numbers became dictators and was matched with the 
remaining numbers, which were receivers. It did not matter whether the subject was 
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previously a buyer or seller, since the grouping was random. Every subject was given 
either a dictator form or a receiver form, along with the same general instructions (found 
in the appendix). The elicitation method, which can be found in Figure 2, was similar to 
the elicitation used in the first half of the treatment. Dictators were given $5 and asked to 
indicate how much money they would like to keep for themselves. Receivers were given 
a Round 4 form similar to Figure 2, but they were given $0. Subjects were asked to fill 
out the form and then fold the forms in half while the experimenter collected the 
 
 
FIGURE 2. EXAMPLE OF THE DICTATOR GAME ELICITATION METHOD 
 
forms from the subjects. Subjects were then asked to fill out a standard survey for the 
Economics department. This survey (found in the appendix) asked general demographic 
questions for use in regression analysis. While the subjects filled out their forms, receipts 
were created and distributed. Subjects received the amount they won in the games and a 
$10 attendance fee. Subjects provided information such as their name and signature for 
departmental accounting purposes on the receipts. After the subjects finished, they 
brought their forms to an assistant who handed each subject their payments individually. 
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All sellers were asked to bring their mugs with them. Those who sold their mugs 
returned them to the assistant and those who did not sell their mugs were allowed to take 
the mugs with them. As buyers returned their receipts, they were given a mug if they 
indicated they were willing to buy the mug at the price. Subjects were then asked to 
leave the room silently. 
 
Treatment 2: Anonymous treatment 
The anonymous games had the same elicitation methods as Treatment 1, and therefore it 
will not be discussed in detail in this section. I will discuss the key differences in the 
methods of Treatment 2 and Treatment 1 which made the treatment anonymous. 
Treatment 2 consisted of 2 groups, comprised of a total of 50 subjects taken from the 
same sample as Treatment 1. Unlike Treatment 1, subjects checked in for the treatment 
with a third party, who was not allowed in the room during the treatment. As subjects 
entered the room, they were once again given an IDN with a receipt at their desk. On the 
receipt, they were asked to fill out all of the information that was needed for accounting 
purposes and their IDN. The third party entered the room and checked to make sure the 
subjects filled out all of the information in the receipt correctly, but did not look at the 
IDN given to the subject. The receipts were then sealed in an envelope and brought to a 
location where none of the experimenters could match the information. The names and 
accounting information were later matched with the payment information by an outside 
party who did not know how the money was made. The third party then left the room. 
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The experimenter distributed the forms and handouts in a similar manner to Treatment 1. 
Unlike Treatment 1, the experimenter was only allowed to know what the subject’s 
appearance and their IDN, to maintain anonymity. To help reinforce the anonymity of 
the treatment, the experimenter stated, “Note that the experimenter will not be able to 
link any specific subject to a subject identification number. Therefore the experimenter 
will not know subject payoffs by individual. After the treatment, a third party will come 
in and distribute your earnings. The experimenter will not be able to link you to your 
identification number, and the third party will be unable to link you and your payment.” 
This information could also be found on the instruction sheets. After each round, the 
experimenter reiterated the previous statement to keep subjects aware of their 
anonymity. The forms, including the dictator game, were collected in a similar manner 
after each round as Treatment 1. Unlike Treatment 1, the assistant sat facing the wall so 
he could not see the identity of any of the subjects. The assistant could only match the 
payment information to the IDN.  
 
After the dictator game, subjects were once again given the surveys and asked to fill 
them out. The assistant put the cash earned by each subject in an envelope and labeled it 
with the IDN and a second envelope with a slip noting whether a subject were allowed to 
keep their mug or not. The experimenter took the envelopes to the subjects who were 
allowed to leave individually and silently. The third party sat outside the room and 
looked inside of the mug envelope and gave or took mugs according to the slips. The 
third party was not allowed to see the envelope containing the payments and did not see 
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the payments or the IDN of the subject. Subjects were not allowed to wait outside the 
room to see the payments or whether the subject received a mug or not, in order to 
maintain anonymity. 
 
Note that the experimenter only knew the face and the IDN of the subject, the assistant 
only knew the number and the payments, the third party only knew the names and faces, 
while the outside individual only knew the names and the payment totals and not how 
the payments were made. Since the identity of the person could not be matched to the 
amount a subject made during each round, the treatment was sufficiently anonymous. No 
party had enough information to match a subject to how they made money during the 
treatment. Since the subject knew that nobody would be able to match how they made 
their money with his or her identity, subjects should not change their behavior to impress 
the experimenter. 
 
Data analysis 
I collected the data and entered it into a spreadsheet. The data was then transferred to 
Stata 12 for statistical analysis. I used a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to first determine 
whether the underlying distribution of the anonymous subjects was statistically 
significantly different than the distribution of the non-anonymous subjects. Second, I 
used a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test with only buyers and only sellers to determine 
whether the buyers’ distributions differed or the sellers’ distributions differed. I then 
used the Pearson χ2 median test to determine whether the anonymous and non-
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anonymous treatments are drawn from distributions which contain the same median. By 
evaluating both the median and the distribution differences between the anonymous and 
non-anonymous groups, I was able to determine if anonymity has an effect on the mug 
price, WTA, and WTP. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
Summary statistics 
Each subject revealed their valuation of the mug as well as how much money they 
wanted to keep in the dictator game. Treatment 1 consisted of two non-anonymous 
groups with sample sizes of 22 and 30 subjects, respectively. Treatment 2 consisted of 
two anonymous groups with sample sizes of 20 and 30, respectively. The two treatments 
totaled 102 subjects. Table 1 lists the summary statistics for each group and the pooled 
data for both the anonymous and non-anonymous treatments. 
 
In Treatment 1, the mean WTA response in Group 1 was $3.27 (median = $4.00) and the 
mean WTP response was $2.95 (median = $3.00). The mean WTA response of Group 2 
was $2.83 (median = $3.00) and the mean WTP response was $2.80 (median = $3.00). 
In Treatment 2, the mean WTA response in Group 3 was $3.20 (median = $3.00) and the 
mean WTP response was $2.70 (median = $3.00). Finally, Group 4 had a mean WTA 
response of $2.93 (median = 3.00) and a mean WTP response of $3.00 (median = $3.00). 
The mean amount kept in the dictator game was $4.00, $3.35, $4.45, and $4.14 in 
Groups 1 through 4, respectively. 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Treatment Anonymous Treatment Mean  Median Std. Dev. 
Treatment 1: Group 1 
 
(n=22) No 
Mug Price 3.11 3.00 1.4714 
WTA 3.27 4.00 1.5869 
WTP 2.95 3.00 1.4045 
Dictator 4.00 4.75 1.1871 
Treatment 1: Group 2 
 
(n=30) No 
Mug Price 2.82 3.00 1.1024 
WTA 2.83 3.00 1.0293 
WTP 2.80 3.00 1.2071 
Dictator 3.35 3.00 1.2403 
Treatment 2: Group 3 
 
(n=20) Yes 
Mug Price 2.95 3.00 1.4039 
WTA 3.20 3.00 1.0328 
WTP 2.70 3.00 1.7192 
Dictator 4.45 5.00 0.9560 
Treatment 2: Group 4 
 
(n=30) Yes 
Mug Price 2.97 3.00 1.2726 
WTA 2.93 3.00 1.4622 
WTP 3.00 3.00 1.1019 
Dictator 4.14 4.50 0.9889 
 
Pooled Data 
Treatment 1 
 
(n=52) 
No 
Mug Price 2.94 3.00 1.2667 
WTA 3.02 3.00 1.2844 
WTP 2.87 3.00 1.2693 
Dictator 3.64 3.00 1.2385 
Pooled Data 
Treatment 2 
 
(n=50) 
Yes 
Mug Price 2.96 3.00 1.3126 
WTA 3.04 3.00 1.2903 
WTP 2.88 3.00 1.3561 
Dictator 4.27 5.00 0.9666 
  17 
Anonymity and the WTA-WTP gap 
The primary result is the lack of a difference in mug values between the anonymous and 
non-anonymous treatments. Since the values of WTA and WTP do not differ 
significantly between anonymous and non-anonymous treatments, I conclude that the 
WTA – WTP gap is not significantly different between the two treatments. To test 
whether there is a statistically significant difference between the anonymous and non-
anonymous treatments, I used both a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and a Pearson χ2 median 
test. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test examines whether the underlying distributions of 
the dependent variable are significantly different between the anonymous and non-
anonymous treatments. The Pearson χ2 median test (henceforth known as a median test) 
determines whether the anonymous and non-anonymous treatments are drawn from 
distributions which contain the same median. 
 
First, I found the data does not exhibit a difference in the value subjects gave the mugs. 
As shown in Table 2, the z value for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was 0.051 (p-
value of 0.9595). This means I cannot reject the null hypothesis and the anonymous and 
non-anonymous mug values have equal distributions. The Median Test has a Pearson χ2 
value of 7.317 (p-value of 0.695). For this value, the null hypothesis is also rejected and 
the anonymous and non-anonymous mug values contain the same median. 
 
 
 
  18 
TABLE 2: WILCOXON-MANN-WHITNEY AND PEARSON χ2 TESTS 
 Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test Pearson χ2 Median Test 
 z p-
value 
Conclusion 
(α=0.05) 
Pearson 
χ2 
p-
value 
Conclusion 
(α=0.05) 
Mug 0.051 0.9595 Can’t Reject H0 7.317 0.695 Can’t Reject H0 
WTA 0.181 0.8560 Can’t Reject H0 7.011 0.535 Can’t Reject H0 
WTP -0.048 0.9620 Can’t Reject H0 4.888 0.844 Can’t Reject H0 
 
 
Next, I found the data does not exhibit a difference in the amount subjects were WTA 
for a mug in both the anonymous and non-anonymous treatments. The tests for WTA, 
exhibited in Table 2, illustrate that the distribution and median of the anonymous and 
non-anonymous amount subjects were willing to accept were identical. This is exhibited 
by both the z-value of 0.181 (p-value of 0.8560) and the Pearson χ2 value of 7.011 (p-
value of 0.535), which both reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Finally, I found the data does not exhibit a difference between the amounts subjects were 
willing to pay for a mug in both treatments. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test had a z-
value of -0.048 (p-value of 0.9620), which rejects the null hypothesis. Therefore, the 
distribution of the amount the subject is willing to pay is the same for both the 
anonymous and non-anonymous treatments. I can also reject the null hypothesis of 
different medians due to the Pearson χ2 value of 4.888 (p-value of 0.844). 
 
Since I did not find any significant difference in the mug value, the WTA, or the WTP, it 
can be assumed that anonymity does not significantly affect the WTA – WTP gap 
exhibited in endowment effect games. This lack of significant difference in these values 
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could signal a flawed elicitation method or an ineffective anonymity procedure. To test 
whether my anonymity procedure was correct and my samples were similar to other 
studies, I performed a dictator game for both anonymous and non-anonymous 
treatments. In Group 1, there was a mean of $4.00 (median = $4.75), shown in Table 1). 
In Group 2, the mean was $3.35 (median = $3.00). The mean for Groups 3 and 4 were 
$4.45 (median = $5.00) and $4.14 (median = $4.50), respectively.  
 
Not only was the mean higher in Groups 3 and 4 than it was in Groups 1 and 2, the z-
value for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was -1.895 (p-value of 0.0580), which is 
close to rejecting the null hypothesis of equal distributions. This lack of significance can 
be partially attributed to the test being two-tailed. A one-tailed test is more applicable to 
the situation because the likelihood of a dictator donating more money than he keeps is 
highly unlikely. Therefore, the one-tailed p-value of 0.0290 is more accurate, which 
leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis. A one-tailed two-sample t test with unequal 
variances had a t-value of -2.048 (p-value = 0.0230). This value leads to a rejection of 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the means. This suggests that the 
mean amount anonymous dictators keep is higher than the mean amount non-anonymous 
dictators keep. This evidence, along with the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, supports the 
findings of Hoffman, et al. (1996), providing evidence that the anonymity procedure is 
satisfactory.   
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The primary problem studied in this paper is not simply whether a WTA – WTP gap can 
be observed. It was proven in KKT that a WTA – WTP gap can be observed, while Plott 
and Zeiler (2005) furthermore observed the gap can diminish, or even disappear, under 
certain circumstances. My research focuses on whether anonymity affects the WTA – 
WTP gap. As my results show, controlling for anonymity is not necessary to obtain 
similar results to Plott and Zeiler (2005). My results show it is likely that anonymity has 
no effect on the WTA – WTP gap exhibited in Plott and Zeiler (2005) or similar 
endowment effect experiments.  
 
Although KKT exhibits a WTA – WTP gap, I use Plott and Zeiler (2005) as the control 
treatment for multiple reasons. Although no statistically significant gap is created 
through the use of this procedure, I chose Plott and Zeiler for not only the consistency in 
their results, but for their replicable procedures and their anonymity procedure. It is 
important to note that it is not significant whether the initial treatment contained a WTA 
– WTP gap. Since I am comparing two treatments with all factors other than anonymity 
held constant, I am framing my treatments in relative terms. 
 
My findings can be interpreted in several ways. Each explanation is merely speculation, 
but provides theoretical answers as to why there is no difference between the WTA – 
  21 
WTP gap. First, subjects did not adjust their strategies to be seen as better bargainers. 
Subjects must make decisions based on how much they value a mug. This decision 
involves examining the mug and analyzing whether he or she would like to take a risk 
and accept less than the value of the mug. Subjects must also take into account the odds 
of their value being rolled as well. Due to the complexity of the decision, subjects do not 
think to adjust their strategy to be seen as better bargainers. Alternatively, subjects adjust 
their strategies to be seen as better bargainers, but other factors counteract this effect. 
The envy of not winning a mug may counteract the adjustment to their strategy. Another 
factor that would counteract the strategy adjustment is set forth by Hoffman, et al. 
(1996). Subjects will adjust their strategy in order to increase their reputation for being 
charitable. This strategy counteracts the need to be seen as a better bargainer, and, along 
with the other factors, completely negates the effect of the need to be seen as a better 
bargainer. 
 
Another explanation for the lack of an endowment effect in either treatment could be the 
use of repetition. To familiarize subjects with the elicitation method, I used two practice 
rounds which could have caused subjects to become “experienced traders.” According to 
KKT, subjects who engage in multiple rounds of trading may realize that over-valuing or 
under-valuing the item being traded is not optimal. They will then adjust their strategies 
and no longer over-value or under-value the item that is being traded. Since my 
experiment had two practice rounds, subjects may have realized they were trading 
inefficiently and changed their strategy when the mug round was started. The subjects 
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would then all trade at the optimal price in either an anonymous or non-anonymous 
situation, and there would be no difference in the mug valuation between buyers and 
sellers.  
 
Another explanation for a lack of a WTA – WTP gap is subjects did not feel attached the 
mug. Subjects may not experience feelings of ownership of a mug given as a gift 
(Loewenstein and Issacharoff 1994). Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) found subjects 
who earn their mug through a task value the mug at a higher price than those who are 
given the mug. A lack of attachment to a mug could cause a lack of an endowment effect 
exhibited in both the anonymous and non-anonymous treatments. This is unlikely, 
considering KKT’s results, which show an endowment effect even though the mugs 
were given as gifts instead of earned. 
 
Finally, the lack of a WTA-WTP gap could not be explained by an incorrect anonymity 
procedure. If subjects did not believe they were truly anonymous during the anonymous 
treatment, then there would be no changing variable between the two groups and no 
difference in answers would be expected. To assess the sufficiency of my anonymity 
procedure, I included a dictator game in my treatments. Hoffman, et al. (1996) 
discovered a statistically significant difference between the amount of money that 
anonymous dictators and non-anonymous dictators kept in the dictator game. I was able 
to match my dictator game results to the results of Hoffman, et al. (1996) and therefore 
conclude that my procedure was sufficiently anonymous. 
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Although I find that anonymity does not affect the WTA – WTP gap, more research 
should be conducted to determine the rationale behind this conclusion. Further research 
must be done to determine whether the practice rounds could have caused subjects to 
become “experienced traders” and whether it causes a difference between the WTA – 
WTP gap exhibited in anonymous and non-anonymous endowment effect games. An 
experiment can also be done which replicates my procedure using mugs which are 
earned, instead of given, to determine whether giving mugs to the subjects causes a lack 
of an endowment effect. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The Endowment Effect Game – Buyer Anonymous 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in individual decision making. Our purpose is to study technical 
issues 
involved in decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for this 
research. 
We will conduct two hypothetical rounds and one paid round. 
 
When prompted, please write your identification number on the top of your page. Note 
that the experimenter will not be able to link any specific subject to a subject 
identification number. Therefore the experimenter will not know subject payoffs by 
individual. After the experiment, a third party will come in and distribute your earnings. 
The experimenter will not be able to link you to your identification number, and the third 
party will be unable to link you and your payment. 
 
ID Number: __________ 
 
Please write your ID Number in the box on the computer screen. 
 
ROUND 1 
In this market the objects being traded are tokens. You are a buyer, so you have an 
opportunity to 
buy a token which has a value to you of $_________. It has this value to you because the 
experimenter will give you this much money for it.  
 
Using the form marked Round 1, please indicate whether you prefer to: (1) Buy a token 
at each price and cash it in for the sum of money indicated above, or (2) Not buy a token 
at this price. 
After you have finished, please place your form in the envelope and pass it to the front 
of the room. Afterwards, one of the prices listed below will be selected at random and 
any exchanges will take place at that price. If you have indicated you will buy at this 
price you will be given a token and will receive this amount of money; if you have 
indicated that you will not buy a token at this price then no exchange will be made and 
you do not receive anything. 
 
Notice the following two things: 
 (1) Your decision can have no effect on the price actually used because the price will be 
selected at random. 
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 (2) It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences at each of the possible prices 
listed below.  
 
Below is an example of Rounds 1-3: 
 
For each price indicate your decision by marking an X in the appropriate column. 
 
Your token is worth $0.10. 
 
I Will Buy   I Will Not Buy 
The Token   The Token 
 
If the price is $0.10          X         _______      
If the price is $0.20   _______   ___X__ 
 
 
 
ROUND 2 
(Identical to Round 1 using different token value) 
 
Please use the form labeled Round 2 for this part of the experiment. 
 
ROUND 3 
You do not own a mug. You have the option of buying one. 
 
Using the form labeled Round 3, please indicate whether you wish to: (1) Pay that 
amount of money and buy a mug, or (2) Not buy a mug at this price. 
 
After you have finished, please place your form in the envelope and pass it to the front 
of the room. Afterwards, one of the prices will be selected at random and any exchanges 
will take place at that price. If you have indicated you will buy at this price you will be 
given the amount for the mug and your mug will be given to a buyer; if you have 
indicated that you will not buy a mug at this price then no exchange will be made and 
you do not receive anything. 
 
Notice the following two things: 
(1) Your decision can have no effect on the price actually used because the price will be 
selected at random. 
(2) It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences at each of the possible prices 
listed below. 
 
  
This subject’s token is 
worth $0.10. 
This subject is willing to 
buy a token for $0.10, 
but not $0.20. 
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The Endowment Effect Game – Buyer Non-Anonymous 
 
This is an experiment in individual decision making. Our purpose is to study technical 
issues 
involved in decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for this 
research. 
We will conduct two hypothetical rounds and one paid round. 
 
When prompted, please write your identification number on the top of your page.  
 
ID Number: __________ 
 
Please write your ID Number in the box on the computer screen. 
 
In this market the objects being traded are tokens. You are a buyer, so you have an 
opportunity to 
buy a token which has a value to you of $_________. It has this value to you because the 
experimenter will give you this much money for it.  
 
Using the form marked Round 1, please indicate whether you prefer to: (1) Buy a token 
at each price and cash it in for the sum of money indicated above, or (2) Not buy a token 
at this price. 
After you have finished, your form will be picked up by the experiment. Afterwards, one 
of the prices listed below will be selected at random and any exchanges will take place at 
that price. If you have indicated you will buy at this price you will receive a token and it 
can be redeemed for its value; if you have indicated that you will not buy a token at this 
price then no exchange will be made and you do not receive anything. 
 
Notice the following two things: 
 (1) Your decision can have no effect on the price actually used because the price will be 
selected at random. 
 (2) It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences at each of the possible prices 
listed below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  29 
Below is an example of Rounds 1-3: 
For each price indicate your decision by marking an X in the appropriate column. 
 
 
Your token is worth $0.10. 
 
I Will Buy   I Will Not Buy 
The Token   The Token 
 
If the price is $0.10          X         _______      
If the price is $0.20   _______   ___X__ 
ROUND 2 
(Identical to Round 1 using different token value) 
 
Please use the form labeled Round 2 for this part of the experiment. 
 
ROUND 3 
You  do not own a mug. You have the option of buying one. 
 
Using the form labeled Round 3, please indicate whether you wish to: (1) Give that 
amount of money and buy a mug, or (2) Not buy a mug at this price. 
 
After you have finished, your form will be taken up by the experimenter. Afterwards, 
one of the prices will be selected at random and any exchanges will take place at that 
price. If you have indicated you will buy at this price you will give the amount of money 
equal to the price of the mug for the mug; if you have indicated that you will not buy a 
mug at this price then no exchange will be made and you do not receive anything. 
 
Notice the following two things: 
(1) Your decision can have no effect on the price actually used because the price will be 
selected at random. 
(2) It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences at each of the possible prices 
listed below. 
 
  
This subject’s token is 
worth $0.10. 
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The Endowment Effect Game – Seller Anonymous 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in individual decision making. Our purpose is to study technical 
issues 
involved in decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for this 
research. 
We will conduct two hypothetical rounds and one paid round. 
 
When prompted, please write your identification number on the top of your page. Note 
that the experimenter will not be able to link any specific subject to a subject 
identification number. Therefore the experimenter will not know subject payoffs by 
individual. After the experiment, a third party will come in and distribute your earnings. 
The experimenter will not be able to link you to your identification number, and the third 
party will be unable to link you and your payment. 
 
ID Number: __________ 
 
Please write your ID Number in the box on the computer screen. 
 
ROUND 1 
In this market the objects being traded are tokens. You are a seller, so you have an 
opportunity to 
sell a token which has a value to you of $_________. It has this value to you because the 
experimenter will give you this much money for it.  
 
Using the form marked Round 1, please indicate whether you prefer to: (1) Sell a token 
at each price, or (2) Not sell a token at this price and cash it in for the sum of money 
indicated above. 
After you have finished, please place your form in the envelope and pass it to the front 
of the room. Afterwards, one of the prices listed below will be selected at random and 
any exchanges will take place at that price. If you have indicated you will sell at this 
price you will give a token and will receive this amount of money; if you have indicated 
that you will not sell a token at this price then no exchange will be made and you do not 
receive anything. 
 
Notice the following two things: 
 (1) Your decision can have no effect on the price actually used because the price will be 
selected at random. 
 (2) It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences at each of the possible prices 
listed below.  
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Below is an example of Rounds 1-3: 
 
For each price indicate your decision by marking an X in the appropriate column. 
 
Your token is worth $0.20. 
 
I Will Sell   I Will Not Sell 
The Token   The Token 
 
If the price is $0.10    _______         X___      
If the price is $0.20        X         _______ 
 
 
 
ROUND 2 
(Identical to Round 1 using different token value) 
 
Please use the form labeled Round 2 for this part of the experiment. 
 
ROUND 3 
You now own a mug. You have the option of selling one to a buyer. 
 
Using the form labeled Round 3, please indicate whether you wish to: (1) Receive that 
amount of money and sell a mug, or (2) Not sell a mug at this price. 
 
After you have finished, please place your form in the envelope and pass it to the front 
of the room. Afterwards, one of the prices will be selected at random and any exchanges 
will take place at that price. If you have indicated you will sell at this price you will be 
given the amount for the mug and your mug will be given to a buyer; if you have 
indicated that you will not sell a mug at this price then no exchange will be made and 
you do not receive anything. 
 
Notice the following two things: 
(1) Your decision can have no effect on the price actually used because the price will be 
selected at random. 
(2) It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences at each of the possible prices 
listed below. 
 
  
This subject’s token is 
worth $0.20. 
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The Endowment Effect Game – Seller Non-Anonymous 
 
This is an experiment in individual decision making. Our purpose is to study technical 
issues 
involved in decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for this 
research. 
We will conduct two hypothetical rounds and one paid round. 
 
When prompted, please write your identification number on the top of your page.  
 
ID Number: __________ 
 
Please write your ID Number in the box on the computer screen. 
 
In this market the objects being traded are tokens. You are a seller, so you have an 
opportunity to 
sell a token which has a value to you of $_________. It has this value to you because the 
experimenter will give you this much money for it.  
 
Using the form marked Round 1, please indicate whether you prefer to: (1) Sell a token 
at each price and cash it in for the sum of money indicated above, or (2) Not sell a token 
at this price. 
After you have finished, your form will be picked up by the experiment. Afterwards, one 
of the prices listed below will be selected at random and any exchanges will take place at 
that price. If you have indicated you will sell at this price you will give a token and will 
receive this amount of money; if you have indicated that you will not sell a token at this 
price then no exchange will be made and you do not receive anything. 
 
Notice the following two things: 
 (1) Your decision can have no effect on the price actually used because the price will be 
selected at random. 
 (2) It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences at each of the possible prices 
listed below.  
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Below is an example of Rounds 1-3: 
 
For each price indicate your decision by marking an X in the appropriate column. 
 
Your token is worth $0.20. 
 
I Will Sell   I Will Not Sell 
The Token   The Token 
 
If the price is $0.10    _______         X___      
If the price is $0.20        X         _______ 
 
ROUND 2 
(Identical to Round 1 using different token value) 
 
Please use the form labeled Round 2 for this part of the experiment. 
 
ROUND 3 
You now own a mug. You have the option of selling one to a buyer. 
 
Using the form labeled Round 3, please indicate whether you wish to: (1) Receive that 
amount of money and sell a mug, or (2) Not sell a mug at this price. 
 
After you have finished, your form will be taken up by the experimenter. Afterwards, 
one of the prices will be selected at random and any exchanges will take place at that 
price. If you have indicated you will sell at this price you will be given the amount for 
the mug and your mug will be given to a buyer; if you have indicated that you will not 
sell a mug at this price then no exchange will be made and you do not receive anything. 
 
Notice the following two things: 
(1) Your decision can have no effect on the price actually used because the price will be 
selected at random. 
(2) It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences at each of the possible prices 
listed below. 
 
 
 
This subject’s token is 
worth $0.20. 
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Dictator Procedure (Non-Anonymous) 
 
In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different person within your room. 
You will not be told who these people are either during or after the experiment. The 
other person will also not be told who you are either during or after the experiment. 
 
The experiment is conducted as follows: When the experiment begins, you will be asked 
to reenter your identification number on the form labeled Round 4. Then, half of you 
will fill out the form labeled Round 4. You will then make a decision on how much 
money you will keep. You will then enter the amount in the box provided on the form. 
For example, if you will keep $7, you will put a 7 on the line provided. This is an 
example only; the actual decision is up to each person. Once you have made your 
decision, please wait for the rest of the people to make their decisions. 
 
The other half will be asked to sit silently until all of the decisions have been made. The 
forms will then be collected by the experimenter. 
 
After all of the people have submitted their decisions, please wait silently as the 
experimenter prepares your payment. The experimenter will then have you individually 
come up with your identification number and trade it for an envelope containing a 
receipt and your payment. Once you have received your envelope, please fill out the 
pertinent information on the receipt and leave the receipt face down with the 
experimenter. Please keep the money within the envelope as you silently gather your 
things and leave the room. 
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Dictator Procedure (Anonymous) 
 
In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different person within your room. 
You will not be told who these people are either during or after the experiment. The 
other person will also not be told who you are either during or after the experiment. 
 
When prompted, please write your identification number on the form labeled Round 4. 
Note that the experimenter will not be able to link any specific subject to a subject 
identification number. Therefore the experimenter will not know subject decisions. After 
the experiment, a third party will come in and distribute your earnings. The experimenter 
will not be able to link you to your identification number, and the third party will be 
unable to link you and your payment. 
 
The experiment is conducted as follows: you will see an amount of money on the screen. 
You will then make a decision on how much money you will keep. You will then enter 
the amount on the line provided on the form labeled Round 4. For example, if you will 
keep $7, you will put a 7 on the line provided. This is an example only; the actual 
decision is up to each person. Once you have made your decision, please wait for the rest 
of the people to make their decisions. 
 
After everyone has finished filling out the forms, you will then place your form in an 
envelope and pass it to the front of the room. 
 
After all of the people have submitted their decisions, please wait silently as the 
experimenter prepares your payment. Remember, the experimenter does not know the 
identity of each person. The experimenter will then have a third party come in to hand 
out the envelopes containing payments. Once you have received your envelope, please 
fill out your name and pertinent information on the receipt and leave the receipt face 
down on your desk. Please keep the money within the envelope as you silently gather 
your things and leave the room. 
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ID Number: ______ 
 
 
Round 1 
 
For each price indicate your decision by marking an X in the appropriate column. 
 
If you buy a token, it is worth $____ . 
 
I Will Buy   I Will Not Buy 
The Token   The Token 
 
If the price is $0.10   _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.20   _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.30   _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.40   _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.50   _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.60   _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.70   _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.80   _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.90   _______   _______ 
If the price is $1.00   _______   _______ 
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ID Number: ______ 
 
Round 2 
 
For each price indicate your decision by marking an X in the appropriate column. 
 
If you buy a token, it is worth $____. 
 
I Will Buy   I Will Not Buy 
The Token   The Token 
 
If the price is $0.20   _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.40   _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.60   _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.80   _______   _______ 
If the price is $1.00   _______   _______ 
If the price is $1.20   _______   _______ 
If the price is $1.40   _______   _______ 
If the price is $1.60   _______   _______ 
If the price is $1.80   _______   _______ 
If the price is $2.00   _______   _______ 
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ID Number: ______ 
 
Round 3 
 
For each price indicate your decision by marking an X in the appropriate column. 
 
I Will Buy   I Will Not Buy 
The Mug   The Mug 
 
If the price is $0.50   _______   _______ 
If the price is $1.00   _______   _______ 
If the price is $1.50   _______   _______ 
If the price is $2.00   _______   _______ 
If the price is $2.50   _______   _______ 
If the price is $3.00   _______   _______ 
If the price is $3.50   _______   _______ 
If the price is $4.00   _______   _______ 
If the price is $4.50   _______   _______ 
If the price is $5.00   _______   _______ 
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ID Number: ______ 
 
Round 4 
 
You currently own $____ . 
 
Please indicate how much money you would like to keep for yourself.       $_______ 
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